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Self-Determination and Moral Variation* 
Bas van der Vossen 
 
Self-determination plays a central role in debates about international morality and 
law. One important argument invokes the value of self-determination in order to 
show that rules of international morality and law should be modest or limited in 
content. The basic idea is clear enough. Self-determination seems to involve a kind 
of social process by which different groups, including political states, can develop 
their own distinctive shared moral codes. And so there can be legitimate moral 
variation between political societies. Because self-determination is valuable, the 
argument goes, acceptable international norms should allow for this variation, at 
least within certain limits. Self-determination thus constrains the demands of global 
justice and, consequently, international law.1 
                                                        
* Thanks to Fernando Tesón, David Lefkowitz, and David Shoemaker for very helpful constructive 
comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
1 David Miller asks rhetorically: “If political communities are in general to be self-governing in 
matters of economic and social policy and so forth, what scope is left for cosmopolitan principles of 
justice that seek to treat people equally regardless of which community they belong to?” See David 
Miller, “Defending Political Autonomy: a Discussion of Charles Beitz”, Review of International Studies 
31 (2005): 381-88, p. 388. Miller has developed this thought in detail in various places. See e.g. David 
Miller, On Nationality, (Oxford University Press, 1995), ch. 4, and David Miller, National Responsibility 
and Global Justice, (Oxford University Press, 2007). For related arguments, see Michael Walzer, “The 
Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 9 (1980): 209–229, 
or Chris Armstrong, “National Self-Determination, Global Equality and Moral Arbitrariness”, Journal 
of Political Philosophy 18 (2010): 313–34. 
 An often overlooked, example of this view, I believe, is John Rawls, The Law of Peoples: with 
“The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, (Harvard University Press, 2001). There are two striking points 
to Rawls’ view. First, in contrast to his earlier argument that states are legitimate only if they are 
liberal (see John Rawls, Political Liberalism, (Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 137), The Law of 
Peoples ascribes this status to both liberal and non-liberal but “decent” societies. That is, both liberal 
and merely decent societies are full members of international society, have rights of political 
independence (pp. 37ff), and their citizens are obligated to obey the law (pp. 65-6). Second, Rawls 
denied that his preferred principles of distributive justice applied internationally. The kinds of 
inequality Rawls thought unbearable between citizens of liberal society, he accepted between 
different societies. 
 Both points are part of Rawls’ attempt to recognize the value of self-determination. First, 
while decent societies are not liberal, Rawls insists that their political institutions contain a system of 
“consultation.” This is supposed to ensure that people’s voices and interests will be among the main 
inputs of political decision-making. The view that arises is that the good of self-determination is part 
universal, part local. What is universal is that a society must be organized around “its common good 
idea of justice” (pp. 65-8). But this requirement can be fulfilled in different local ways, including but 
not limited to the liberal way. This, Rawls suggests, preserves “significant room for the idea of a 
people's self-determination” (p. 61, see also p. 111). Moreover, second, Rawls announces that the 
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 We can state this argument in the following (enthymematic) form: 
(1) States can have a right to self-determination  
(2) Self-determination allows for moral variation between different communities 
(3) Therefore, to respect state self-determination, international moral norms 
should be limited 
The relevance of this argument goes beyond the point that international principles 
of justice should be more modest than domestic ones. The claim that states have a 
right to self-determination is among the most commonly accepted principles of 
international ethical and legal thought. And state self-determination is often thought 
to be important precisely because it allows for moral variation between societies.2 
Self-determining states are thought to enjoy a kind of moral status – one that calls 
for respect, non-interference, independence, democracy, and even a right to curb 
immigration.3 
 Yet despite its prominence and potential implications, it is difficult to find 
any precise accounts of what exactly is involved in self-determination, why it 
matters, or how it might lead to legitimate moral variation. That is, while many seem 
confident in their assertions about what is required to respect self-determination, 
few seem confident to assert what self-determination really is. This poses a problem 
because many of the former assertions are disputed, and some, including the 
argument above, are highly controversial. But without a real grip on what self-
                                                                                                                                                                     
good of self-determination is his reason for endorsing limited redistributive principles 
internationally (p. 85). 
2 Many argue, for example, that self-determination matters because it allows for distinct national 
cultures that provide a background for people to develop meaningful characters and make 
meaningful decisions about how to live. See David Miller, On Nationality, (Oxford University Press, 
1997), Armstrong, “National Self-Determination, Global Equality and Moral Arbitrariness”, Will 
Kymlicka, “Territorial Boundaries: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective,” in David Miller and Sohail 
Hashmi (eds.), Boundaries and Justice: Diverse Ethical Perspectives, (Princeton University Press, 
2001), pp. 249-75, Margaret Moore, “Cosmopolitanism and Political Communities,” Social Theory and 
Practice 32 (2006): 627-58 
3 For examples of such arguments, see Daniel Philpott, “In Defense of Self-Determination”, Ethics 105 
(1995): 352–385, Margaret Moore (ed.), National Self-determination and Secession, (Oxford 
University Press, 2003), Michael Walzer, Just And Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical 
Illustrations. 4th ed., (Basic Books, 2006), Michael Walzer, “The Moral Standing of States”, 
Christopher H. Wellman, A Theory of Secession, (Cambridge University Press, 2005), Andrew Altman 
and Christopher H. Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice. Reprint., (Oxford University 
Press, 2011). 
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determination is, we lack the means to settle questions about what we have to do to 
respect it. 
 The purpose of this essay is to move away from this state of affairs. It offers 
an account of why self-determination can lead to genuine moral variation, and it 
asks whether political states can indeed be self-determining in this sense. 
 
1. Desiderata for a Theory of Self-Determination 
Formulating an account of the nature of self-determination is no easy task. Some of 
its contours are clear enough: the idea of self-determination is closely related to the 
idea of autonomy, and self-determining communities are often described as self-
governing. Beyond that, it is notoriously difficult to explicate the idea in any clear 
and convincing way. 
 A satisfying theory of self-determination should occupy the space between 
two commitments that are seemingly in tension. The first of these is that self-
determination can happen only when people live and act, in some robust sense, 
together. Its locus is the group or community, not just the individual or even the sum 
of individuals that make up the group. As Christopher Wellman puts it, self-
determination is “something that can be exercised by a collective as a whole rather 
than individually by persons in a group.”4 Self-determination is an importantly 
collective value.5 
 The second commitment expresses moral individualism. This demands that 
an account of self-determination avoid excessive romanticism, or even mysticism, 
about the state or political society. Such romanticism occurs when one views society 
or the state as a moral entity in and of itself, with a kind of moral status that is 
independent of, and maybe even more important than, the true ultimate locus of 
moral value: the individual. To satisfy the demands of moral individualism, one’s 
                                                        
4 See Wellman, A Theory of Secession, p. 41 (emphasis in original) 
5 See Altman and Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice. See also Walzer, “The Moral 
Standing of States”, and Walzer, Just And Unjust Wars. 
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account of self-determination and its value must ultimately be based on 
observations about individuals and their value.6 
 The difficulty of developing a satisfying theory of self-determination thus lies 
in explaining how truly collective social processes can lead to legitimate moral 
variation between societies, in a way that does not posit groups or states as 
independent entities of moral value. More precisely, we can formulate the following 
three (again, seemingly conflicting) desiderata for a theory of self-determination. 
Such an account must explain how: 
(a) Self-determining groups can develop different moral codes 
(b) These codes can be different from, and not simply reducible to, the moral 
beliefs of their individual members 
(c) Groups, societies, and states are not fundamentally morally valuable, but 
derive whatever value they have from their individual members 
 Many available approaches to self-determination fail to adequately 
incorporate all of these desiderata. A purely institutionalist theory, for example, 
might suggest that the value of self-determination lies in people living under 
political institutions they have created themselves.7 But this leaves unexplained why 
self-determination might bring about legitimate moral variation between societies. 
After all, it seems perfectly consistent with such a view to maintain that each of 
those states should implement exactly the same norms. International and domestic 
norms might thus be the same. The idea of self-determination thus cannot be fully 
understood by merely focusing on the creation of independent political institutions. 
 A purely individualist theory, by contrast, might see group self-determination 
as simply the sum of individuals choosing to live together.8 On such a view, the 
outcomes of self-determination would be a collection of individual choices. But how 
can that explanation capture self-determination’s collective nature? Self-
determination, we said, is something that essentially occurs at the level of the group, 
                                                        
6 See the careful discussion in Wellman, A Theory of Secession, ch. 3. 
7 For a possible example of such a view, see Wellman, A Theory of Secession. Wellman suggests (p. 57) 
that violations of self-determination are wrongful because they disrespect the collective achievement 
of people to create their own state.  
8 See e.g. Philpott, “In Defense of Self-Determination” 
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not just among several separate individuals. The collective nature of self-
determination disappears from sight if we simply reduce it to individual choice.9 
 In what follows, I offer a theory of self-determination that aims to 
incorporate each of these three commitments. Drawing on recent findings by 
Christian List and Philip Pettit about group agency and judgment aggregation,10 I 
will describe how groups can come to have moral codes that are at the same time 
based on, yet separate from, the moral views of their individual members. I will then 
explain why the development of such group moral codes can be valuable. Finally, I 
will ask whether these processes can take place within political states. Here, my 
conclusions will be skeptical. While self-determination can lead to genuine moral 
variation, the requisite processes do not take place within states. 
 
2. The Possibility of Collective Self-determination 
A moral code is a set of propositions about morality that is endorsed by its holder.11 
A group moral code, if such a thing is possible, thus consists of the set of beliefs 
about morality that is shared by a group. The theory of self-determination I will 
develop holds that when different individuals together form a group, their several 
beliefs about morality (their several moral codes) can combine into a new and 
separate moral code. This new moral code will be held by the group as such, and will 
not be readily reducible to the beliefs of its members. As a result, this theory can 
                                                        
9 Hegel’s theory of the state might be an example of a view that fails commitment (c). Hegel wrote: 
“The state is the actuality of the ethical idea. It is ethical mind qua the substantial will manifest and 
revealed to itself, knowing and thinking itself” And: “The state is absolutely rational inasmuch as it is 
the actuality of the substantial will which it possesses in the particular self-consciousness once that 
consciousness has been raised to consciousness of its universality. This substantial unity is an 
absolute unmoved end in itself, in which freedom comes into its supreme right. On the other hand 
this final end has supreme right against the individual, whose supreme duty is to be a member of the 
state.” See G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right: the Philosophy of History, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford 
University Press, 1967), pp. 155-6. See also the discussion in Fernando Tesón, Humanitarian 
Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 3rd ed., (Transnational, 2005), pp.62ff. 
10 The argument below relies on the argument presented in Christian List and Philip Pettit, Group 
Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents, (Oxford University Press, 2011). In a 
way, what follows can be seen as the extension of List and Pettit’s findings about group agency to the 
realm of group self-determination. The title of the next section pays homage to the title of the first 
part of their book. 
11 No doubt this is to simplify considerably. The intuitive notion of a moral code may well include 
more than merely propositions, such as attitudes, affects, and so on. I set these complications aside 
for the sake of argument. 
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explain how self-determination can lead to genuine moral variation between 
groups. After all, different groups, being constituted by different members, can 
produce different moral codes. However, because the group’s code is ultimately 
based on, or the product of, the moral codes of its individual members, this theory 
still satisfies the demands of moral individualism. 
 To see how this is possible, we need to consider on what grounds we might 
ascribe beliefs about moral propositions to groups. To stay true to the individualism 
we have endorsed, such group beliefs must be ultimately explainable in terms of the 
beliefs of individual members. There are numerous ways of doing this, but let us 
here focus on the most obvious one: a simple majoritarian rule. A group, we might 
then say, has a certain belief if the majority of its members has that belief. 
 Of course this way of understanding group beliefs seems to ignore claim (b) 
above. That is, it seems to understand group beliefs as straightforwardly reducible 
to those of its members. But this appearance is deceiving. For, under certain 
conditions, there simply is no way of understanding group beliefs as aggregated 
individual beliefs. More precisely, it is not possible to arrive at a consistent set of 
group beliefs in this way. Even more precisely, if moral beliefs have basic logical 
connections, and a group’s moral code is going to satisfy minimal requirements of 
consistency between those beliefs, then it can be necessary for the group to endorse 
certain propositions that are not held by the majority of its members. 
 It will be easier to see this by looking at an example.12 Consider a group’s 
beliefs about distributive justice. Let us assume that there is no single morally 
correct system of distributive justice but that, within certain limits, a variety of 
different regimes are acceptable. Among these figure regimes which enforce 
strongly egalitarian distributions as well as regimes that allow markets to be the 
primary determinant of holdings. Let us further suppose that the individual 
members of the group base their views about distributive justice on their views 
concerning two other issues – to put it slightly differently, they treat their views 
                                                        
12 The example here is a variation on a problem that can arise in legal contexts, first presented in 
Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager, “Unpacking the court”, Yale Law Journal 96 (1986): 82–
117. List and Pettit discuss similar cases, which they call “discursive dilemmas.” 
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about distributive justice as conclusions based on these premises. These are: (i) that 
the point of a society’s economic system is to enhance economic productivity, and 
(ii) that tampering with people’s property rights through redistributive policies will 
significantly reduce productivity.13 
 Finally, suppose that there are certain basic logical connections between the 
conclusion about distributive justice and these two issues such that a consistent 
person must favor the market as the primary determinant of people’s holdings if she 
assents to both (i) and (ii). Table 1 lists the views on these issues of a three-person 
group. The views of each individual, as well as the views of the group based on the 
views of the majority, are listed below. 
 
Table 1: Group beliefs on distributive justice 
        Property to enhance                 Redistribution reduces      Market outcomes should 
      productivity           productivity  determine holdings 
P1  Yes    No    No  
P2  No    Yes    No 
P3  Yes    Yes    Yes 
----  ----    ----    ---- 
G  Yes    Yes    No 
 
 Note that each of the individuals has internally consistent beliefs about 
distributive justice. None of the persons endorses both premises of the argument 
without also endorsing the conclusion. However, the aggregate views of the group 
are inconsistent in just this way. For while the majority of the group believes both 
that the point of property systems is to enhance economic productivity and that 
                                                        
13 Two points of clarification. First, as should be obvious, nothing for the present argument turns on 
this particular example. The assumptions in the text are only chosen for ease of exposition. If you 
strongly disagree with these points, you are free to insert your own favored issue. Second, and 
equally obvious, the example given here significantly understates the complexity involved. The 
propositions (i) and (ii) are really not simply, but complex propositions, each of the constituent parts 
of which people might take diverging views. This complexity bolsters the result below as well as its 
implications. That is, the more complex the issues involved, the stronger the case for the possibility of 
self-determination. See also List and Pettit, Group Agency, p. 77 
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redistributive policies interfere with this, the majority of the group also believes 
that a strongly egalitarian distribution ought to be enforced. Thus, ex hypothesi, the 
group’s moral views are internally inconsistent even though none of its members’ 
are. 
 The result here, of course, is not a product of the particular issue concerning 
distributive justice. It can occur with any set of beliefs that have modest logical 
connections. Less obviously, the result is also not a feature of the majoritarian 
method of aggregating individual beliefs. As List and Pettit have shown, given a 
number of plausible conditions, this problem can arise for any method of 
aggregation (participatory, hierarchical, majoritarian, super-majoritarian) – with 
the only exceptions being unattractive methods such as dictatorships.14 
 For obvious reasons, a group’s moral code should be internally consistent. If 
the group is at the same time committed to premises that imply a conclusion, and 
the denial of that conclusion, it will not be able to come to any determinate views. 
Proponents of the conclusion will be able, and quite reasonably so, to point to the 
group’s views about the premises. Opponents of the conclusion will be able, and 
quite reasonably so, to point to the group’s view about the conclusion. Thus, without 
an internally consistent group moral code, the group will lack the ability to arrive at 
determinate answers for certain cases – like the case of distributive justice.15 
 This raises some difficult questions. Groups face a choice between basing 
their views on the majority’s views concerning the premises or the majority’s views 
concerning the conclusion of a certain issue. It is a substantive moral issue which of 
the two will be the correct way to go, and this question lies beyond the focus of this 
essay. But the very fact that there is such a choice to be made shows something 
important for our purposes. For, whichever way we go, it will be true that certain 
                                                        
14 See Christian List, Philip Pettit, “Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result”, 
Economics and Philosophy 18 (2002): 89-110. The result here is an extension of Arrow’s famous 
impossibility-theorem. 
15 List and Pettit claim that this kind of consistency is a condition of group agency. Some people have 
challenged this thought. See e.g. Robert Sugden, “Must Group Agents Be Rational? List and Pettit’s 
Theory of Judgement Aggregation and Group Agency”, Economics and Philosophy 28 (2012): 265-73, 
p. 269. But even if Sugden’s challenge succeeds against the theory of group agency, the account of 
group self-determination I am offering here survives. For my account relies on the very plausible 
assumption that morality should be consistent. 
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propositions need to be recognized as genuine elements of a group’s moral code 
even though they are not directly reducible to the views of its members. Either the 
group adopts the majority’s views on the conclusion – but then it will commit itself 
to beliefs about the premises that are contrary to the majority’s views. Or it adopts 
the majority’s views on the premises – at the price of ignoring the majority’s views 
on the conclusion. In either case, the group will have adopted a view that is 
(directly) contrary to its views on one issue, even though it is (indirectly) based on 
its members’ views about another issue. That is, in either case, the group will have a 
view that is genuinely formed at the group-level. 
 Note just how far-reaching this result is. For one, the beliefs of a group’s 
members turn out to be both unnecessary and insufficient for particular group 
beliefs. In this way, the group can achieve views that are, in a sense, autonomous or 
self-standing. Groups as a whole might endorse something even though each of its 
members does not endorse it. In fact, the group might endorse something that each 
of its members opposes.16 
 Let us call group norms that arise in this way emergent group norms.17 The 
processes by which emergent group norms arise, I propose, are processes of group 
self-determination. Self-determination, then, can indeed lead to genuine moral 
variation between groups. 
 This account helps explain both the “self” and the “determination” of self-
determination. It is “determination” because groups, as such, can produce their own 
moral codes. And it is determination by the “self” because these processes occur on 
the basis of members’ moral codes. This account therefore satisfies all three claims 
(a)-(c) identified in the previous section. It demonstrates (a) how genuine moral 
variation between self-determining groups is possible, (b) why this variation is not 
simply variation between the views of groups’ individual members, yet (c) it does so 
                                                        
16 This, in turn, seems to violate certain other intuitive ideas about how rational groups should 
behave, such as that they allow Pareto-superior moves. See Robert Sugden, “Team Preferences”, 
Economics and Philosophy 16 (2000): 175-204, p. 188. For a different kind of argument, see Margaret 
Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation, (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 137. 
17 In technical terms, the group’s beliefs supervene on the beliefs of its members. Roughly, A 
supervenes on B if, and only if, necessarily, the facts about A cannot change without some 
accompanying change in the facts about B. For discussion, see List and Pettit, p. 65. 
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by invoking only facts about its individual members (and no mysterious or magical 
group-entities or values). 
 
3. The Value of Group Self-Determination 
With this basic description of how self-determination works in place, we can now 
turn to the question of its value. What, if anything, is the importance of these 
processes such that their results command the kind of respect that self-
determination is usually thought to command? 
 The answer to this question is not obvious. It will not do, for example, to 
simply state that it matters for people to live on shared or mutually agreed terms, 
and that those terms require group membership. One might think this, say, if one 
thought of self-determination as a simple extension of the autonomous choices of 
individual members, or based on something like Rousseau’s idea of a General Will. 
Such approaches typically regard a group’s moral code as something that its 
individual members are rationally committed to endorse – either because they 
actively endorsed it (through voting, say) or because the group outcome represents 
their views in a relevant way. 
 But while it may well be true that there is value in living on mutually agreed 
terms, this cannot explain the value (if any) of group self-determination. For group 
self-determination can actually be in tension with living on mutually agreed terms. 
After all, as we have seen, self-determining groups can produce emergent moral 
codes that contain elements that its members individually reject. In such a case, 
living on the terms that are the outcome of self-determination means living on terms 
that one rejects. 
 The real question, then, is how group self-determination might have value for 
the reason that it enables emergent group norms that are relatively independent of 
individual beliefs and norms, not in spite of it. One such source of value is that group 
self-determination offers a particularly attractive way for individuals who would 
otherwise have intractable moral disagreement to interact and cooperate. Consider 
different people who disagree on a certain issue, like the correct interpretation of 
distributive justice. There are a number of ways in which they might interact with 
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one another. One way would be to deliberate and discuss the issue. Often, people 
come to certain conclusions on the basis of faulty reasoning, and deliberation might 
help people to identify their mistakes, thereby removing the source of the 
disagreement. Another way is to sideline the issue. Sometimes we can 
“compartmentalize” issues and allow different people to act on their different views 
of how things ought to be. Freedom of religion might be a case in point, which 
enables theists and atheists to live together without having to settle upon a shared 
view about the existence of God or the importance of religion. 
 But these options cannot resolve all cases of disagreement. For one, as the 
example of group inconsistencies in Table 1 above showed, even those who reason 
in internally consistent ways can nevertheless end up with collectively inconsistent 
beliefs. And not all moral issues can be compartmentalized in the way that religious 
freedom achieves. Sometimes people need to coordinate on a single outcome, and 
perhaps distributive justice is one such case. 
 In these cases of disagreement, norms that emerge as a result of group self-
determination can help solve the problem. That is, members of the same group, 
whose individual moral outlooks are incompatible on issues where compatibility is 
required, can use the group’s emergent norm as a salient point of convergence for 
their actions. Consider again the case illustrated in Table 1 above. The three persons 
involved there deeply disagree about not only the requirements of distributive 
justice itself, but also about the merits of the premises that support their respective 
views about this. The process of group self-determination offers them a way of 
overcoming their disagreement: they can use the group’s emergent view as a point 
on which they can converge.18 
 This feature of self-determination is attractive for a number of reasons. First, 
the process is reliable. Because none of the views of individual members are 
necessary or sufficient for the group’s norms, it turns out that even people with very 
complex and intricately different individual moral views can combine to bring about 
                                                        
18 Recall: this emergent view can be either the conclusion of the argument or one of the premises. The 
point here is neutral between the two. 
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a relatively simple and clear moral code at the group level.19 Second, and more 
obviously, it allows people to resolve what might otherwise become a conflict by 
non-coercive means. Members of groups who take emergent norms as devices for 
coordinating their actions can thus live together peacefully. 
 Emergent norms are particularly well suited for this purpose because they 
are not, as we have seen, readily reducible to any of the personal views of the 
disagreeing parties. This allows them to have a kind of impartial character – 
something different than one of the parties insisting that his or her view is correct 
after all. Yet, because they are indirectly (and, given certain methods of aggregation, 
potentially symmetrically) based on the views of the parties involved, they are not 
simply imposed on them either. These group codes are still importantly connected 
to the views of their members. In fact, group norms and individual views are not 
static. Group norms and individual views can interact. When a group adopts a 
certain position, this can lead individual members to reconsider their own views on 
the matter. Thus, processes of self-determination will likely involve repeated 
adjustments of individual views to group norms, and vice versa. This tightens the 
connection between emergent group moral norms and the views of its members.20 
 It can make sense, then, for people to value the processes by which emergent 
norms come about. And it can make sense to insist that others respect these norms. 
The reason is the same: the process of group self-determination provides people 
who would otherwise face real problems of disagreement with the possibility of 
living together on terms that are logically and morally consistent as well as self-
imposed in the sense that they are the result of their own views. 
 Before moving on, two points are worth stressing. First, the fact that self-
determination can be valuable does not undo the need for independent moral 
standards that determine what emergent norms are acceptable. It may be tempting 
here to suggest that we should evaluate the acceptability of a group’s emergent 
norms in terms of the underlying norms of its members. But this will not do. For 
                                                        
19 Cf. List and Pettit, Group Agency, p. 77 
20 Note that this bolsters the idea of self-determination itself. For when there is this kind of back-and-
forth relation between group and individual beliefs, it becomes even more difficult to reduce the 
group’s moral code to its members’ respective views. 
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even though the group’s norms are the product of its members’ views, the two are 
importantly separate. It is in principle possible for a group to develop a problematic 
collective code even if all its members’ views are acceptable, as well as for people 
who each have deeply unjust views to develop a morally acceptable code as a group. 
If we are to continue to distinguish between morally acceptable and unacceptable 
group norms, then, we need to appeal to something other than the views of group 
members. We need independent moral norms to make this judgment. 
 Second, the coordination made possible by group self-determination is 
different from other ways in which disagreeing people can manage to cooperate. 
Self-determination cannot be equated, for example, to coordination by rational but 
disagreeing persons on the basis of conventions. Such conventions can allow people 
to cooperate when they prefer to act on the same terms – even if this means they 
cannot act on their individually preferred option. In such scenarios, if a convention 
exists that identifies an option as the one on which to coordinate, it can become the 
best option for each to act in that way. 
 An example of this is the kind of convention that often arises in subway 
tunnels. If everyone in the tunnel is walking on the right hand side, and assuming 
they do not want to bump into people all the time, this gives all people entering the 
tunnel a reason to walk on the right hand side as well. By walking on the right side, 
they all can get to where they are going, and that is ultimately what they care about 
the most. This is true even if only some of them like this way of doing things, while 
others think it would be better if everyone were walking on the left. Thus, the 
convention can help people with varying preferences coordinate their actions. 
 Such conventional coordination is a common and important social 
phenomenon. Yet there are fundamental ways in which it differs from cooperation 
on the basis of emergent group norms. For example, conventional cooperation is 
successful because each of the parties involved sees coordinating action as in their 
self-interest. Such cooperation thus cannot survive the absence of a shared 
preference for coordination. When people disagree about whether it is preferable to 
act in a coordinated way, conventional cooperation breaks down. The same is not 
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true for emergent group norms. These can survive even disagreement about 
whether to coordinate in a given case.21 
 Another difference is the ways in which conventional norms and emergent 
group norms come about. Conventions can arise between persons who are perfect 
strangers, and not members of a group in any meaningful way, such as people 
entering a subway tunnel. All that is needed is that they share a preference for 
coordinating their actions in certain ways. By contrast, emergent group norms can 
only arise in what I have called self-determining groups. They require a kind of 
aggregation procedure and can only provide reasons for compliance to their 
members. 
 
4. Self-Determination in Political States 
Recall the argument with which we started: 
(1) States can have a right to self-determination  
(2) Self-determination allows for moral variation between different communities 
(3) Therefore, to respect state self-determination, international moral norms 
should be limited 
The account of self-determination above vindicates the second premise of this 
argument: self-determination can give rise to moral variation through emergent 
group norms. What about the first premise? Can these processes take place within 
political states? The answer to this question depends on whether the conditions of 
membership in self-determining groups allow for states to be among them. This 
section argues that, contrary to what is commonly thought, states cannot satisfy 
those conditions. 
 The question of the membership conditions in self-determining groups 
matters not just because it allows us to see whether states can be truly self-
determining groups. It also matters because such membership might mean that one 
be bound to follow the group’s emergent norms. Some philosophers think, for 
                                                        
21 Obviously, the absence of agreement to cooperate will cause significant practical problems even in 
cases of self-determination. The point here, however, is different: emergent group norms can exist 
independently of agreement or preference to coordinate, while conventions cannot. This suffices to 
demonstrate the difference between the two. 
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example, that it is a general feature of group membership that one becomes 
obligated to follow the group’s collective rules or plans.22 This raises the stakes of 
our discussion considerably. For while we have so far been focusing on the 
opportunities that group self-determination brings, the possibility of emergent 
group norms being binding provides some potential threats as well. If mere 
membership in a group can make one bound by the emergent group norms, then 
self-determination can also significantly limit the liberty one would otherwise enjoy. 
 Another reason this question matters is that changes in a group’s 
membership can affect its emergent moral code. Since the composition of members’ 
views determines the group’s views, currently present members will have a stake in 
who else becomes a member of their group. Given a certain membership profile, the 
group’s moral code might resemble more closely a code that fits with one’s interests, 
beliefs, or preferences. This raises a number of questions. Groups can be created, 
and their membership can be influenced and molded in several ways. Some of these 
are more agreeable than others, and so the possibility of self-determination may 
incentivize bad behavior. Similarly, one might raise questions about the morality of 
immigration. If states are self-determining groups, does this mean they get to 
control who joins them through restricting immigration?23 
 For these reasons as well as others, it cannot be true that just any set or 
collection of persons will qualify as a self-determining group. And of course that is 
clearly right. For example, there is in some sense a group that contains all people 
living within a mile of the Mason-Dixon Line. But it is highly implausible that this 
group is capable of self-determination or generating obligations. The reason is clear: 
the condition of membership in this group refers to the morally arbitrary or 
meaningless fact of mere geographical location. And groups with membership 
                                                        
22 See e.g. Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation 
23 Some theorists think that this fact about self-determination can justify coercive immigration 
restrictions for states. For the argument that such views fail even if, contrary to the point here, states 
can be genuinely self-determining, see Bas van der Vossen, “Immigration and Self-Determination”, 
Politics, Philosophy & Economics, (forthcoming), doi: 10.1177/1470594X14533167. 
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conditions that refer to only morally arbitrary or meaningless facts cannot have the 
kind of moral characteristics I have attributed to self-determination.24 
 It is easy to identify certain sufficient conditions for membership in morally 
relevant groups. Most plausibly, genuine consent can suffice. Consider, for example, 
a group like a union, the members of which each agree to join the group. As such, 
they can all become bound by the union’s decisions regarding controversial matters, 
such as the acceptable terms of labor contracts, including decisions that do not 
reflect their own evaluation of the matter at hand. In general, genuine consent can 
change one’s moral status. And it can clearly generate the kind of membership that 
can come with obligation. 
 There are also plausible examples of groups (including those that might be 
characterized by obligations) that do not require consent. Consider for example a 
group of neighbors whose houses are all painted a certain color. Suppose the 
neighbors chose to live in the neighborhood because they like color-coordinated 
houses. And suppose it is commonly known among them that the houses are 
supposed to remain that color. Under those conditions, it may be that the neighbors 
form a kind of group, and perhaps even that they are, as members of the group, 
obligated not to change the color of their homes. 
 One of the more permissive accounts of group membership, in the sense of 
accepting weak conditions for membership, is Margaret Gilbert’s “plural subject” 
theory. According to Gilbert, groups (and group obligations) are the result of people 
undertaking “joint commitments” to act together as a group. Such joint 
commitments are the result of certain kinds of behavior on the part of the people 
who will become the members of the group. These kinds of behavior express their 
mutual readiness to become jointly committed in ways that are common knowledge 
among the would-be members. This is the source of the group’s existence and its 
accompanying obligations because it involves a commitment of the will on the part 
of its members.25 
                                                        
24 For a similar point, see A. John Simmons, “External Justifications and Institutional Roles”, Journal of 
Philosophy 93 (1996): 28-36. 
25 See Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation, pp. 128, 135, 138, 144, 166, and 271 
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 Let us call theories that require this kind of involvement of the will for group 
membership in self-determining (or obligating) groups soft-voluntarist theories. We 
can call them voluntarist because they insist that the morally relevant properties in 
virtue of which people are members of groups make essential reference to their 
wills. But we can call them soft-voluntarist because they will recognize as sufficient 
undertakings of the will that fall short of consent or other clear outward signs of 
acceptance usually associated with voluntary undertakings. (Insisting on these 
would be a sign of hard-voluntarism.) Soft-voluntarism is plausible as a necessary 
condition for membership in at least certain groups. It rules out cases like the 
people living close to the Mason-Dixon Line. But it rules in cases like the color-
coordinating neighbors. 
 We cannot here settle the debate over whether soft-voluntarist conditions, 
like Gilbert’s idea of joint commitment,26 can also be sufficient for membership in 
groups and for the accompanying obligations. The important question for our 
purposes, instead, is whether those views, if true, would support the first premise of 
the argument above. If people can become jointly committed by being members of a 
neighborhood, do they also become jointly committed by being members, citizens, 
or subjects of the state? That is, when people live together as citizens in a state, 
might they thereby become members of self-determining groups in the way 
required for them to become obligated to comply with the state’s emergent 
norms?27 
 There are two reasons why this thought ought to be resisted. The first has to 
do with the normative significance of baseline, or normal, behavior. One cannot 
become jointly committed merely by remaining where one is, going about one’s 
ordinary life. Undertaking new obligations requires some sort of personal 
engagement, uptake, or indication. This is an implication of the voluntarism that 
                                                        
26 For other examples, see Raimo Tuomela, The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social 
Notions, (Stanford University Press, 1995). Tuomela writes: “A central thesis to be defended is that 
the performance of a joint action, X . . . requires that the participants have explicitly or implicitly 
agreed to perform action X” (p. 73). Or see Robert Sugden, “Team Preferences”, pp. 184, and 192ff. 
who defends “taking oneself to be a member” as a condition for membership. 
27 Gilbert might think so, as she argues that membership in a state can generate obligations. See 
Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation, parts II and III. 
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soft-voluntarist theories accept. Thus, even if others take their going about their 
normal daily lives to indicate their readiness to become obligated, and even if this is 
publicly known, that fact alone cannot suffice to render one’s normal daily life 
obligating. 
 To see this, consider the following example. Suppose Donna lives in a 
neighborhood populated by extremely virtuous people. At some point, Donna’s 
neighbors start a campaign for organ donation. They post signs saying things like 
“This neighborhood donates kidneys!” and “We all donate!” The significance of these 
signs is common knowledge among the neighbors and they take themselves to be 
obligated to donate their kidneys. But suppose that Donna does not want to donate a 
kidney, and also does not want to leave the neighborhood. If Donna chooses to 
remain where she lives, she plainly does not thereby still become obligated to 
donate her kidney. Her merely staying where she was, living her normal life, cannot 
suffice for this. 
 If this is right, then mere citizenship in a state is not sufficient to become a 
member in the sense required here. After all, most people become citizens of their 
states in much the same way as Donna became part of the organ-donating 
neighborhood. They are citizens by birth, ascription, or the decisions of their 
parents. For most, citizenship requires no personal engagement, uptake, or 
indication whatsoever. Indeed, actions that might normally constitute the relevant 
signals (getting government issued identification, for example) are in many 
countries necessary simply in order to live a normal life. But if such actions are not 
sufficient to render Donna obligated to follow her group’s norms about organ 
donation, then it seems similarly true that they are not sufficient to render citizens 
obligated to follow their state’s emergent group norms. They are simply part of the 
ordinary baseline of behavior. 
 The second reason for doubting that states are actually self-determining 
units is slightly different: the appropriate conditions for taking people to be 
obligated are sensitive to the comprehensiveness and impactfulness of the 
obligations in question. This is due to the uncertainties and possible confusions that 
typically accompany the conditions of membership, and especially the type of “soft” 
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conditions that are involved in proposals such as Gilbert’s idea of joint commitment. 
A lot can be unclear here: the nature and extent of the joint commitments around 
which a group is organized, the actions that constitute their acceptance, what people 
already count as its members, and so on. These are all matters of interpretation and, 
as such, are often surrounded by ambiguities, uncertainties, and indeterminacies. 
That is, while it might be common knowledge that certain behaviors are obligating, 
the details about the behaviors, the obligations, and the group might all be less than 
fully clear. 
 So even if people in such situations do become obligated in some particular 
way, it is not true that others can be justified in holding them to be bound, unless 
there is some reassurance that they were committing themselves in just that way. 
This is especially true if the obligations in question are onerous and far-reaching in 
nature. As a general rule, the more comprehensive or impactful the implications of 
group membership, the more demanding we should be of the conditions for 
membership. For groups the impact of which is relatively minor, such as the color-
coordinating neighbors, “soft” actions, such as moving into the neighborhood, might 
suffice. But for groups the impact of with is far-reaching, clearer and “harder” 
conditions are plainly required. 
 To see this, consider a slightly different example. Suppose Donna comes 
across a march of people who are campaigning for more organ donations. They hold 
signs saying things like “On our way to donate kidneys! Will you?” And “Come 
donate kidneys with us!” Suppose that Donna cares about organ donation, sees the 
march in progress, and decides to walk along. When the march arrives at a hospital, 
its participants start preparations to have their kidneys removed for donation. Can 
the hospital’s physician take the fact that Donna was part of the march to be 
sufficient for removing her kidney? Clearly, the answer is no. Given what is at stake, 
the mere decision to join in the march, even though it satisfies Gilbert’s conditions of 
joint commitment, cannot be enough. For others to take Donna to be obligated to 
donate her kidney, more than just this is required. Donna would have to do 
something like sign a consent form. 
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 If this is correct, then the prospects for the thesis that citizenship is sufficient 
for taking membership in the state as a self-determining group are also dim. States 
are among the most comprehensive and impactful groups. They are coercive 
institutions that require and enforce the obedience of their subjects. They use their 
powers to legislate on a wide variety of social, economic, cultural, and personal 
matters. And the possibility of self-determination occurring at the state level further 
increases their impactfulness by attaching a binding emergent moral code to 
membership. Given that the argument we are inspecting here concerns how to treat 
people globally, any demand that we water down the rights and freedoms of 
individuals in the international realm in the name of self-determination again needs 
some “harder” forms of assurance. We should expect, then, that for present 
purposes the conditions of membership in the state qua self-determining group be 
more like agreeing to a kidney transplant than like moving into a neighborhood. 
 Note that this is not to reassert the consent theory of political obligation or 
state legitimacy. According to that theory, people are subject to the state’s authority 
if and only if they voluntarily give their consent.28 But we have not been focusing on 
state authority as such. Instead, our question has been whether membership in a 
group can imply that one is bound to follow the group’s emergent norms. And when 
this kind of membership becomes as pervasive as being subject to state authority, 
consent, or something close to it, seems required. This leaves open the possibility 
that state authority is immune to this argument about group membership. Perhaps 
state authority is special in ways that group membership is not. And it leaves open 
the possibility that membership in less impactful and comprehensive states can 
result from the satisfaction of softer conditions. 
 Either way, then, the upshot is that for all practical purposes we cannot 
accept that being identified as a citizen or subject by the governments that rule us is 
sufficient for membership in a self-determining state. Absent the requisite 
undertakings, engagements, or indications on the part of all individual persons who 
live there, the mere fact of such identification by the state is as brute and morally 
                                                        
28 The classic discussion remains A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, 
(Princeton, 1979) 
 21 
impotent a fact as living close to the Mason-Dixon Line. Genuine state self-
determination thus is a mirage. 
 This seems the correct result. If being considered a citizen were sufficient for 
membership in a self-determining group, then some seriously counter-intuitive 
implications would follow. It would render incoherent, for example, claims made by 
secessionist movements on the grounds of self-determination. These, we would be 
forced to say, are simply mistaken because, by their current state’s identification as 
citizens, the people seeking secession already qualify as full members of a genuinely 
self-determining group. It would therefore not even be possible for their right to 
self-determination to be denied. Calls for secession would thus be obviously 
mistaken in the face of state self-determination. This is implausible. 
 The account proposed here of course also implies that secessionist groups 
cannot establish self-determining states, but the reasoning is importantly different. 
For the account does allow groups as such to be self-determining. It only rules out 
that the state they want to establish – which will identify members and non-
members of the group as citizens on grounds of residence or birth and coercively 
govern them – will be. But this is a general result. And so the implausible implication 
is avoided. Secessionist states lack a right to self-determination for the same reason 
as larger states do.29 
 Note that argument above cannot be challenged by claiming that 
membership in a self-determining group requires only the acceptance, consent, or 
agreement of that group’s majority. For in order to identify he majority of a group 
we first need to know who counts as its members. We cannot say that 51 people’s 
votes constitutes a majority without knowing that the group has no more than 100 
members, and who those members are. But that is precisely the question we are 
                                                        
29 States can approximate self-determination to greater or lesser extents. Many of the things normally 
associated with the idea of self-determination move a state closer to this ideal, including secession. 
By seceding, a group would a state the citizenship of which is closer to membership in the self-
determining group. Similarly, democratic politics and deliberation might move states closer to true 
self-determination. These are aggregation procedures that translate individual beliefs and 
preferences into group codes. State sovereignty protects a society against the kind of outside 
interference that would override a group’s ability to arrive at its own emergent norms (i.e. norms 
that are the product of the beliefs of its members). 
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addressing here. We are asking about the boundaries of group membership, who 
does, and who does not, count as a member in the first place. Important though 
majority rule might be, this is one problem it cannot solve. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The argument with which we started this essay thus turns out to be unsound. Self-
determination can give rise to moral variation, but political states are not the sites of 
the requisite processes. Insofar as the demands of global justice go, then, defenders 
of modest or minimalist international moral standards should look elsewhere for 
support. 
